Remember how a couple of months ago everyone was talking about an imminent Israeli air strike against Iranian nuclear facilities? And how the Obama administration was trying very hard to placate Israeli PM Netanyahu?
If you missed the hoopla surrounding this issue
here is a summary of all the hard rhetoric. At the time, I reasoned that despite all that bluster, Israel had no intention to undertake such a risky move (especially one with so little payoff) and surmised that there were probably other goals behind this campaign.
Then there was a lull in the sound and fury. It coincided with a meeting on 14 April between Iran and the so called P5+1 (5 permanent Security Council member + Germany)
in Istanbul. I am guessing that the location was a subtle signal to Iran. On the positive side, it meant that a regional issue was handled within the region and Iran was not "summoned" to one of the Western capitals as it used to be the case. The host country was a Muslim neighbor and probably the only Sunni entity without an ax to grind against Shiites. On the negative side, it was a reminder to Iran that Turkey was an ascending regional power and its interests were more aligned with the US than with the Islamic Republic.
During the negotiations the Turkish FM Davutoglu (the architect of the now defunct "zero problems with our neighbors" policy)
proved to be a skilled intermediary and managed
to mollify both
sides behind closed doors. But, on the face of it, these talks were hardly a resounding success story, as the two sides simply agreed to continue to talk. This month they will meet again in Iraq.
Fast forward to two days ago, when Yuval Diskin the former head of
Shin Bet (Israel's version of MI5 or FBI or CSIS) issued
a blunt warning that the Netanyahu government was misleading the Israeli public about the positive effects of an air strike.
He said:
“They tell the public that if Israel acts, Iran won't have a nuclear bomb,” he explained. “This is misleading. Actually, many experts say that an Israeli attack would accelerate the Iranian nuclear race."
Not unexpectedly, this lead to
an avalanche of criticism from Netanyahu cabinet members and officials. Even without any knowledge of Israeli politics you could rightly guess that such harsh words from former intelligence chiefs are very rare.
I was curious about what triggered his intervention. Especially since a few days earlier IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz told Haaretz newpaper that
he did not believe that Iran will decide to build nuclear weapons. While Gen. Gantz' tone is much more measured than the Diskin outburst, his statement directly contradicted both his Defense Minister and his Prime Minister.
Yesterday, the New York Times had a front page piece entitled "
Experts Believe Iran Conflict Is Less Likely." Despite the less than stellar results of the Istanbul round, the administration officials played it as a turning point:
The talks two weeks ago in Istanbul between Iran and the United States and other world powers were something of a turning point in the current American thinking about Iran. In the days leading up to the talks, there had been little optimism in Washington, but Iranian negotiators appeared more flexible and open to resolving the crisis than expected, even though no agreement was reached other than to talk again, in Baghdad next month.
The paper of record, as they would like to call themselves, argued that this new shift away from conflict was due to changing circumstances in both countries:
The threat of tighter economic sanctions has prompted the Iranians to try more flexible tactics in their dealings with the United States and other powers, while the revival of direct negotiations has tempered the most inflammatory talk on all sides.
A growing divide in Israel between political leaders and military and intelligence officials over the wisdom of attacking Iran has begun to surface.